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Book

2026

In the tradition of moral philosophy, long dominated by a rationalist paradigm, the idea of moral intuition has often been a source of embarrassment. How can the mind form a moral judgment within seconds, without any apparent reasoning? In the spirit of neuroethics, this book demystifies moral intuition by examining the mental and neural processes that generate such automatic evaluations. Addressed to specialists in philosophy, psychology, and AI ethics, the book systematically investigates three questions: how moral intuitions work, how they can improve, and how they can be implemented in artificial agents.

Peer-reviewed articles

2026

Sattler, S., D. Cecchini, V. Dubljević,  et al. “Understanding Public Perspectives in Germany Towards Illegal Stimulant Use for Neurocognitive Enhancement in Professional Roles: The Case of Doctors.” Neuroethics 19 (20),  2026. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-026-09637-5

2025

D. Cecchini and V. Dubljević, “Moral complexity in traffic: Advancing the ADC model for autonomous vehicles decision-making”, Science and Engineering Ethics 31 (1): 1-17.

​https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-025-00528-1

M. Pflanzer, D. Cecchini, S. Cacace, V. Dubljević, “Morality on the road: the ADC model in low-stakes traffic vignettes”, Frontiers in Psychology, 16.

https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1508763

G. Cantamessi, D. Cecchini, “Why moral intuitions are not emotions: A critical examination”, The Journal of Ethics 29: 681–697.

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-025-09518-8

D. Cecchini, M. Pflanzer and V. Dubljević, “Aligning artificial intelligence with moral intuitions: an intuitionist approach to the alignment problem”, AI and Ethics 5: 1523–1533.

https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-024-00496-5

D. Cecchini, S. Brantley and V. Dubljević, “Moral judgment in realistic traffic scenarios: Moving beyond the trolley paradigm for ethics of autonomous vehicles”, AI & Society 40: 1037–1048.

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-023-01813-y

H. Bissette, D. Cecchini, R. Sterner, E. Eskander, V. Dubljevic, “What’s left of moral bioenhancement? Reviewing a fifteen-year debate”, HEC Forum 37: 411–434.

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10730-024-09545-2

2024

D. Cecchini, “The reliability challenge to moral intuitions”, Neuroethics 17: 32.

https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-024-09566-1

D. Cecchini, “Experiencing the conflict: the rationality of ambivalence”, The Journal of Value Inquiry 58 (1): 1-12.

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-021-09859-1

2023

D. Cecchini, “Moral intuition, strength, and metacognition”, Philosophical Psychology 36 (1): 4-28.

https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2022.2027356

2022

D. Cecchini, “Are moral intuitions intellectual perceptions?”, Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 13 (1): 31-40.

https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2022.0003

2021

D. Cecchini, “Dual-Process Reflective Equilibrium: Rethinking the Interplay between Intuition and Reflection in Moral Reasoning”, Philosophical Explorations 24 (3): 295-311.

https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2021.1923785

2020

D. Cecchini and Francesco Emanuelli, “Percezione morale”, Aphex 22. 2020.

http://www.aphex.it/index.php?Temi=557D03012202740321050401777327

D. Cecchini, “Problems for Moral Particularism: Can we Really Escape General Reasons?”, Philosophical Inquiries 8 (2): 31-46.

https://www.philinq.it/index.php/philinq/article/view/256

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