Research
My research, situated at the intersection of moral psychology and applied ethics, is structured around three fundamental questions:
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What mental processes underlie moral judgment and behavior?
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How can moral judgment and behavior be improved?
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How can human moral judgment and behavior be reproduced within AI systems?
I have contributed to the first question through a novel psychological theory of moral intuition, grounded in the notions of automaticity and confidence. In parallel, I have investigated how automatic and reflective processes interact in moral reasoning, proposing an original dual-process model named "Dual process reflective equilibrium".
My current research extends this framework by engaging with the theory of dyadic morality (Schein and Gray 2018), both by exploring its theoretical implications and by addressing some of its conceptual and empirical challenges.
My contribution to moral epistemology has centered on the cognitive and social biases that systematically affect moral judgment. In my monograph, I examined the most significant biases shaping moral intuitions and critically evaluated several promising debiasing strategies aimed at improving moral judgment, including individual and collective reasoning, appeals to moral expertise, and the use of nudges.
In the coming years, I intend to expand this line of research by exploring forms of nudges specifically designed to enhance individual moral judgment and behavior, with particular attention to their normative legitimacy and empirical effectiveness.
My contributions to applied ethics have primarily focused on autonomous vehicles. In collaboration with colleagues from the NeuroComputational Ethics Research Group, I have investigated the psychological mechanisms underlying moral decision-making in traffic contexts. Building on this work, I am currently developing a theory of artificial moral agency that is compatible with the functional capacities of contemporary AI systems.
Other tangential lines of research concern the philosophy of emotions—particularly on conflicting and recalcitrant emotions—as well as on the ethical implications of using biomedical technologies to enhance moral judgment and behavior.
My approach to these problems is deeply interdisciplinary, integrating the conceptual rigor of analytic philosophy with the empirical methods of cognitive and behavioral sciences.
Current projects
Contact me to know more or to get a draft
1. Expanding dyadic morality
(with Kurt Gray)
What is moral judgment fundamentally about? According to the theory of dyadic morality (TDM), the core of moral judgment consists in the perception of an interaction between two minds: an intentional agent causing suffering to a vulnerable patient. TDM, in its current version, overly focuses on prototypical forms of harm, while neglecting moral domains such as benevolence, fairness, and sacrificial dilemmas. This paper aims to bridge these gaps by by developing a bivalent version of TDM that systematically incorporates both harm and help, as well as moral reasoning. Furthermore, the paper provides a solid biological ground for the harm and help dyadic templates, connecting TDM with the cooperative function of morality and human event cognition.
2. Feasible and desirable artificial moral agents
Several scholars within machine ethics have argued that equipping artificial agents with capacities for moral judgment and reasoning represents a promising strategy for aligning AI systems with ethical values. Yet, the idea of artificial moral agents remains controversial, both in terms of technical feasibility and normative desirability. This paper addresses these concerns by developing a plausible conception of artificial moral agency, grounded in moral-psychological knowledge and compatible with the capabilities of contemporary machine learning algorithms. To do so, I outline and defend a model of instrumental moral reasoning that enables AI systems to plan and execute morally relevant goals within structured environments. At the heart of this model lies a conception of non-conscious intentionality, which provides the foundation for attributing a minimal, but functionally significant, form of moral agency to artificial systems.
3. Effective and legitimate moral nudges
In recent years, nudges have emerged as one of the most prominent policy tools for influencing behavior in ways that remain compatible with the principles of liberal democracies. While nudges have been extensively studied in the domains of personal welfare and individual decision-making, nudges explicitly targeting moral judgment and behavior remain largely underexplored, and a systematic research program in this area is still lacking. Two central open questions in this emerging field concern when influencing moral judgment through nudges is normatively legitimate and which nudging strategies are empirically effective in improving moral behavior. This project aims to address these gaps by designing nudges that effectively improves moral judgment and are consistent with the principles of liberal democracy.